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EVIDENCE*
HARRY P. THoMsON, JR.**
I. THE TEST OF PROBATIVE FORCE
The supreme court applies traditional language to the law of evidence
with varying results from case to case. These cases can be reconciled only
if the premise is adopted that all of the basic law of evidence can be reduced
to the single test of probative force. Simply stated this test requires that
evidence, to be admissible, must be of sufficient force so that if believed it
logically tends to prove or disprove a fact or issue necessary to a decision
of the case before the court. In recent decisions, the supreme court appears
to be measuring the admissibility of evidence by the test of probative force.
The court uses formalized rules or exceptions to rules to explain its decisions.
But it appears clear from the recent decisions that the court is following
the basic philosophy of determining admissibility by whether or not evidence
has probative force on a material fact or issue.
II. EXPERT WITNESSES AND OPINION EVIDENCE
Kinealy v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.1 is required reading for
the lawyer plagued with the problem of proving causation by an expert
witness. This decision delineates the difference between the expert's state-
ment of possibility and probability. The expert was a geologist who testified
in detail concerning the technical subject of the cause of landslides. The
closest he came to applying his scholarly knowledge to the particular facts
of the case was the expression that "it was extremely likely" that defend-
ant's activities in excavating a ditch caused the landslide which damaged
plaintiff's property. Further testimony developed that without specific soil
tests, the geologist could not state with reasonable certainty that the ex-
cavation of the ditch was the cause of the landslide. This reduced the
*This article contains a discussion of selected Missouri court decisions re-
ported in volumes 357 through 370 of South Western Reporter, Second Series.
**Partner, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; A.B. 1937,
LL.B. 1939, University of Missouri.
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probative force of his testimony to that of a scientific possibility and nothing
more. The court stated:
Other possible causes for the landslides for which the company
would not be liable, several of which appear to have been as likely
as the one assigned, were not excluded as causative factors. Where
the evidence does not exclude all other causes and where no layman
could know or have any reasonable basis for an inference as to
cause, opinion of experts that a certain occurrence or condition
might or could produce a certain result is no more than an assurance
that such a result is scientifically possible, and does not alone con-
stitute substantial evidence that such occurrence or condition
would cause it. . . . That the circumstantial evidence is consist-
ent with the theory that the cutting of the ditches caused the land
falls is not sufficient. The circumstances in evidence must prove
this as a reasonable probability and the jury may not be permitted
to reach this conclusion by 'theorizing upon assumed factual prem-
ises outside of and beyond the scope of the evidence.'2
In Kinealy the court held that to make a submissible case or show
causation, the expert must go further than the mere stating of a scientific
possibility. He must testify that it is his professional opinion, based on the
data available to him, that the result in question most probably came from
the cause claimed by plaintiff. Under the language of this decision, it should
make no difference whether the expert testifying is a geologist, physician,
engineer, chemist, architect, metallurgist, or any other type of expert.
While the opinion of such experts as to scientific possibility may be ad-
missible to establish that certain end results can occur from any given
set of facts, the opinion of mere possibility alone does not have sufficient
probative force on the issue of causation to make a submissible case. To
supply causation the expert must go further and testify that based upon
the facts before him a certain condition is the most probable result of those
facts.
A contrasting court of appeals decision is Hay v. Ham.3 The testimony
of a physician was ruled admissible and competent on the limited issue of
the physical condition of plaintiff. Defendant contended that an expert
opinion was necessary to show causation of the condition described by
the physician. The physician had limited his testimony to a diagnosis and
2. Id. at 404.
3. 364 S.W.2d 118 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
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description of plaintiff's condition at the time of an examination immediately
before trial. The Kansas City Court of Appeals held that in view of other
facts and circumstances in the case, the physical condition of plaintiff de-
scribed by the expert could have resulted only from the automobile collision
in question. Consequently the causative factor was supplied and the expert's
opinion as to causation was unnecessary.
In the writer's opinion the Hay decision treads on dangerous ground.
The description by plaintiff, or any other layman, of a physical condition
using technical terms may not be founded upon sufficient scientific knowl-
edge. It is one thing to say that lay testimony establishes that plaintiff
sustained injuries as a result of a collision. It is an entirely different matter
to allow lay testimony to establish causation between an occurrence and
plaintiff's physical condition as subsequently diagnosed by a physician.
This danger could be avoided if a proper hypothetical question were used.
Before testimony of any witness, expert or otherwise, is admissible, he
must have sufficient knowledge that his testimony has probative force on a
fact or issue before the court. This has been so often stated that little
difficulty is encountered with respect to lay witnesses. Apparently lawyers
sometimes forget that the same requirement applies to expert witnesses.
Not only must the expert be qualified by superior training and knowledge
of the subject on which he is testifying, but the facts which form the basis
of his opinion, whether supplied by the expert's own observation or by a
hypothetical question, must be adequate and of sufficient similarity to
the facts actually introduced in evidence as to have probative force. Thus,
in Begley v. Connor4 it was held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding testimony of plaintiff's expert on stopping distances
when it was not established that the wetness of the pavement was the same
when the expert examined it as at the time of the accident. The supreme
court remarked that the plaintiff probably could have cleared up the factors
which caused the evidence to be excluded.
When properly qualified and a sufficient factual basis is established by
the expert's actual observation or by a hypothetical question, the opinion
of the expert will not be excluded merely because he has knowledge of addi-
tional inadmissible facts or hearsay so long as the opinion is not based on
the inadmissible facts. Indeed, once the record contains sufficient facts to




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1963
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
cloak the expert's opinion with probative force, that opinion will not be
excluded merely because he may have knowledge based on inadmissible
evidence. As stated in Reifsteck v. Miller,5 unless affirmatively shown to
the contrary it will be presumed that the expert's opinion is based solely
on those facts which have been properly admitted into evidence so that
the expert's opinion itself is admissible.
III. EVIDENCE WHICH IS NOT OF SUFFICIENT RELEVANCE
TO MEET THE TEST OF PROBATIVE FORCE
Offered evidence may be qualified as being within the direct knowledge
and observation of the witness, but may still be inadmissible unless it
validly and logically tends to establish a fact or prove or disprove an issue
before the court. In Walton v. United States Steel Corps defendant at-
tempted to prove that plaintiff was its statutory employee under the Mis-
souri Workmen's Compensation Law7 by offering evidence that at some of
defendant's plants in different localities, other employees engaged in similar
operations. The supreme court held that this testimony was properly ex-
cluded upon plaintiff's objection that it was "irrelevant." The language of
the Walton opinions clearly illustrates that the supreme court was concerned
with whether the evidence of operations that employees engaged in at
other localities actually tended to prove or disprove the issue before the
court in determining its relevancy. Thus we are back to the test of probative
force.
In other instances the supreme court has discussed the best evidence
rule as not being applicable to collateral issues when the determining factor
is again whether the evidence tends to prove or disprove a fact or issue
necessary to a determination of the case. In State ex rel. Buslh v. Elliott,9
plaintiff attempted to secure the coverage limits of defendant's liability in-
surance policy through interrogation. Plaintiff argued that he was entitled
to do this for purposes of the voir dire examination and that the insurance
policy itself was the best evidence of the financial interest of the insurer.
In an exhaustive opinion the court pointed out that the only purpose of
determining the name of the insurance carrier was to judge the qualifica-
5. 369 S.W.2d 229 (Mo. 1963).
6. 362 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1962).
7. § 287.010, RSMo 1959.
8. Supra note 6, at 625.
9. 363 S.W.2d 631 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
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tions of prospective jurors. The insurance policy and the coverage limits
did not tend to prove or disprove any disputed fact or issue necessary for a
determination of the case itself. This would appear to be a sound basis for
the court's decision that this information was beyond the scope of discovery
as it did not tend to establish admissible evidence rather than merely
placing the label of a collateral issue on the evidence.
In Reyburn v. Spires'° one of the issues to determine was whether a
judgment debtor was indebted to plaintiff before the entry of a default
judgment. The court held that the petition upon which the default judg-
ment was based was not admissible in the present proceedings to prove
the facts alleged in that petition. The default judgment proved only that
the judgment debtor owed the plaintiff from the date of the judgment. The
petition on which the default judgment was based did not necessarily have
probative force to prove every fact alleged in tthat petition including the
prior evidence of the debt. This was an instance where the proffered evidence
simply was not of sufficient strength to stand by itself to prove the fact in
dispute.
Boehm u. St. Louis Public Service Co.- can be rationalized on the
basis of the public records exception to the hearsay rule. But this and similar
decisions concerning hospital records illustrate that the true measure is
the probative force of the business entry. In Boehm the hospital record
contained a notice that defendant driver did not know whether he was un-
conscious or not; that he was rational but slightly confused; and that he
bad an alcoholic breath. None of these notations were necessary for medical
treatment of the defendant driver. This portion of the hospital record was
held admissible under the Uniform Business Records Act.12 Again the basis
of the statute, and the admissibility of this type of evidence, is that in the
ordinary affairs of men such business records not made for the purpose of
litigation are recognized as having probative force. The admissibility of this
type of notation on a business or hospital record cannot be justified by
merely stating that it is an exception to the hearsay rule. If this is the sole
reason given, the logical inquiry is, why the exception?
10. 364 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1963).
11. 368 S.W.2d 361 (Mo. 1963).
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IV. JUDIcIAL, NOTICE
The doctrine of judicial notice is one of the best examples of the appli-
cation of the test of probative force. There is no other justification for the
doctrine of judicial notice and there is no other basis for prediction of what
state of facts will be noticed judicially by a court as being proved or ac-
cepted as true.
In State v. Division 1287 of Aral. Ass'n. of Motor Coach Emp.,13 a
King-Thompson case, the court stated that it may not assume ignorance
of what everybody knows. 14 There the court was discussing what could
and did happen to inhabitants of a metropolitan area in the event trans-
portation services stopped. But people and even courts differ as to "what
everybody knows." The writer suggests that when in doubt, prove the
particular facts.
Of course there is no problem with respect to the court's files and
previous proceedings before the court in the same case.1 5 Even here a careful
lawyer may desire to call to the court's attention the previous proceedings
or that portion of the court's own files which is desired to be noticed.
At the other end of the spectrum the court has taken judicial notice
that traffic noise from trucks going up an incline may be heard for a con-
siderable distance in every direction, and that annoyance from such noise
is shared by all who reside in the neighborhood.'8 And the court has taken
judicial notice that it may be necessary both to slacken the speed and at
the same time swerve an automobile to avoid a collision.'
7
The breadth and scope of judicial notice is illustrated by the notice
taken in the following court of appeals decisions. In Rapp v. Industrial
Commission,' the population of two Missouri towns from the latest United
States census records; in Mitclell v. Newsom'9 the habits, characteristics,
and instincts of dogs; in Copher v. Barbee,20 that customers in self-service
stores handle and move items displayed for sale and there are many pos-
13. 361 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
14. Id. at 42.
15. Wessels v. Smith, 341 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1962).
16. State ex rel. State Highway Comm. v. Turk, 366 S.W.2d 420 at 422 (Mo.
1963).
17. Rephlo v. Weber, 367 S.W.2d 557 at 561 (Mo. 1963).
18. 360 S.W.2d 366 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
19. 360 S.W.2d 247 (St. L. Mo. App. 1962).
20. 361 S.W.2d 137 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962).
[Vol. 28
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sible causes for explosions of bottles containing carbonated beverages; in
Hay v. Ham,21 that the millions of motor vehicles operating daily on high-
ways constitute one of the deadliest and most destructive agencies in present
society; in State ex rel. Gibson v. Missouri Board of Chiropractic Exam-
iners,22 that an item is obtainable by the public without a prescription does
not mean that it is not a medicine or a drug; and in Boyher v. Gearhart's
Estate, 3 the value of nursing and housekeeping services by a member of
the family.
V. SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS
In Mitchell v. Robinson 24 the supreme court again declared that the
rule excluding self-serving declarations is a part of the hearsay rule. The
real basis for the exclusion of self-serving declarations, whether properly
considered as hearsay or not, is the fact that they have little or no probative
force. In Mitchell the court was faced with the problem of whether the
admission of such improper evidence was prejudicial so as to require a
reversal. It was concluded that where there was direct evidence on the
same facts and issues as those included in the self-serving declarations,
it was not reversible error. The writer suggests that a different result may
well have been reached had there not been direct and proper evidence
other than the self-serving declarations which, in the court's opinion, tended
to establish the facts included within the purview of the self-serving declara-
tions.
VI. BUSINESS REcoRDs
To be admissible as business records, documents must be identified as
those made in the ordinary course of business by a person regularly charged
with the duties of making such records. In Chailland v. Smiley25 the supreme
court, as it has before, clearly indicated that it will not go to ridiculous
lengths to require identification. X-rays were held admissible when pro-
duced by the record librarian of a hospital and identified by a doctor as
X-rays ordered by him and taken at his direction even though he was not
personally present when such X-rays were made. The quantum of proof
21. Supra note 3.
22. 365 S.W.2d 773 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
23. 367 S.W.2d 1 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
24. 360 S.W.2d 673 (Mo. 1962).
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was sufficient to protect the identity of the business record. The writer
believes that each case must stand upon a reasonable interpretation of
identity requirements. If in Chailland there had been any evidence that
would cast doubt as to the identity of the X-rays, the court would probably
have required additional proof.
The proper use of police reports to prove admissions of parties or to
refresh the memory of the testifying officer was the subject of two decisions
by the supreme court. In Thomas v. Wade28 it was held that the police
report itself was qualified under the Uniform Business Records Act.2 It
was made in the regular course of business of the police department by an
employee of the department in his course of duty at or near the time of
the act or event recorded. The court emphasized that the mere identifica-
tion of the record made admissible only that portion containing evidence
which would be competent if testified to in person or otherwise directly
proved. The plaintiff raised the objection that there was no proof that the
officer who made the report actually heard the witness make the statement
contained therein which was read to the jury. The officer admitted that
he had no independent recollection of what statements were made to him
during the course of the investigation of the automobile striking the plain-
tiff. He testified that the record produced contained all of the information
pertinent to the accident. That was as far as he could go. The court held
that under the circumstances this was sufficient because the statement, to
be recorded, had to be made to the officer or in his presence. Again the
statement in the business record, considered in the context of the sur-
rounding circumstances, had sufficient probative force to be admissible.
For lack of probative force, a different result was obtained in Olsten v.
Sisn. 28 Plaintiff attempted to introduce admissions contained in a police
report. Defendant, who had purportedly made the admissions, denied them.
The officer by whom plaintiff sought to establish the authenticity of the
report had no personal knowledge of the statements made by the parties,
took no part in making the report, did not know who made it, and did
not know that the information therein was accurate. The admissions were
held properly excluded. The writer doubts that there was much question
that the police report in Olsten was actually a part of the records of the
26. 361 S.W.2d 671 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
27. §§ 490.660-.690 RSMo 1959.
28. 362 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. 1962).
(Vol. 28
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police department made in the ordinary course of business. Where the
police report failed, regardless of any technical requirements of the Uniform
Business Records Act,29 was that the affirmative testimony of the identifying
officer indicated that the report was so unreliable that it had no probative
force whatsoever.
VII. Wrrm TESTIMONY
A party is not bound by conflicting evidence from his own witnesses.
If a party, or one of his witnesses, testifies to a set of facts upon which
there is no conflicting testimony or evidence in his case, the party is bound
by such evidence. However, the supreme court takes a realistic view of this
situation, recognizing the fallability of humans and that identical testimony
is seldom given with respect to any single set of facts. In Bell v. Pedigo30
the court held that plaintiff was not bound by her witness's evidence as to
the distance of a truck from the point of collision at the time the witness
first observed the truck. The witness's estimate was held not to be incon-
sistent with the theory of plaintiff's case. Therefore it did not destroy what
was otherwise a submissible case for the jury. To reach this conclusion,
the Court had to disregard a part of the witness's testimony which was
inconsistent with more favorable testimony from other witnesses.
In Whaley v. Zervas3l defendant admitted in her deposition that she
could not estimate the speed of plaintiff's approaching truck when defendant
pulled into the intersection. Defendant submitted an instruction on con-
tributory negligence. Plaintiff contended that defendant's admission as to
inability to judge the speed of plaintiff's truck absolutely barred the defense
that plaintiff's contributory negligence in failing to keep a vigilant lookout
was a proximate cause of the accident. The court held that defendant's
own testimony did not necessarily eliminate plaintiff's negligence as a cause
of the collision. This was not a question of conflicting evidence, but of the
separation of evidence as to conflicting theories of how the collision cccurred.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The law of evidence is evolutionary in nature. It develops by definition,
clarification, and determination by case decision. There have been no abrupt
29. S tra note 12.
30. 364 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1963).
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departures from the normal course of the evolutionary process in the law
of evidence during the period covered by this article. It is helpful when
considering the current decisions and their application to future factual
situations to apply the test of probative force. Otherwise the valid results
which may be obtained from case to case, even under the application of the
same formalized rule, remain unexplained.
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